An Introduction to the Pros and Cons of the U.S. Re-joining the Iran Nuclear Deal
During Donald Trump’s four-year presidency, one of the landmark U.S. Middle East policies was its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal, and its reactivation of sanctions against Iran. Supporters believe that this was a sign of the U.S. fulfilling its moral duty as the leading democratic state against an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, despite Iran being certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as complying with its nuclear agreements, the nuclear deal itself is full of loopholes. If there is no amendment rectifying these loopholes, Iran will eventually possess nuclear weapons. Critics believe that Trump’s unilateral withdrawal undermined the credibility of the U.S. and damaged relations with its major European allies who urged for compliance. While there have been numerous detailed policy papers and reports discussing the technical issues of the Iran nuclear deal, this article looks to provide an introduction to the benefits and costs of the U.S. re-joining Iran nuclear deal.
In short, opposing voices in the U.S. and hostile Iranian conservatives are the two biggest obstacles preventing the U.S. from re-joining the agreement. U.S. sceptics are worried that the deal only partially limits Iran from developing nuclear technology without actually restricting its development of ballistic missiles and support for terrorist activities in neighbouring countries. Worse, the easing of the sanctions on Iran freed up resources allowing the country to expand its influence in the Middle East. Consequently, U.S. allies in the region have faced increased turbulence and unrest. In addition, while the original agreement does not permit the IAEA to perform spot checks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and even grants them the right to refuse official inspection requests from the IAEA, a sunset clause allows restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme to be lifted after 2025, something that was totally unacceptable to Trump and the U.S. hawks.
Iran’s ambition to increase production of enriched uranium is no secret and presents an increasingly serious threat to the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. As such, some supporters of resuming the dialogue between the U.S. and Iran think that Biden should not make compliance with the original nuclear agreement to be the final goal. Instead, he should push for more restrictions.
However, some defenders of the Iran nuclear deal stress that, although flawed, the political reality is that it was not easy to reach the Iran nuclear deal in the first place. Now that U.S.–Iran relations are worse than when the agreement was being negotiated, there is less room for discussion. Trump withdrawing from the agreement, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani — one of Iran’s most powerful men and commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force — and the murder of Iran’s leading nuclear expert Dr Mohsen Fakhrizadeh by Israel has deepened Iran’s hatred towards the U.S. and Israel. Iranian hawks have used these incidents to stir up nationalistic sentiment, and moderate figure President Rouhani has lost out in the core political power struggle.
While it is certainly true that Iran has not yet declared the U.S. and Israel to be enemies because of its weaker military capabilities, it is obvious that increasing the production of enriched uranium is to develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, despite suffering economically as a result of COVID-19, Iran has not slowed down its enrichment programme.
Some liberals, probably including Biden himself, hoped that there would be an opportunity to ease U.S.–Iran tensions after Trump stepped down as president. Unfortunately, soon after Biden won the U.S. presidential election, Israel — the U.S.’ most important ally in the Middle East and obviously not welcoming an improvement in the U.S.–Iran relationship — assassinated Dr Fakhrizadeh in an attempt to thwart Iran’s nuclear weapons development plan. Some also saw this as a way to prevent the U.S. from reverting to its Obama-era Iran policy. In fact, it would not be a surprise if Israel took further action against Iran without the consent of the U.S., which would put the latter in very difficult position.
In theory, Iran faces a severe economic crisis and is supposedly tempted to ask the U.S. to lift the sanctions. As such, U.S. hawks are convinced that by persisting with the current hard-line policy, Iran will have little choice but to compromise. However, no one knows how big the gap is between Iran’s economic crisis and the break-down of the regime. Iran has already reiterated that it will not compromise and that Biden should comply unconditionally with the original nuclear deal.
Critics also point out that the adverse effects of reactivating sanctions on Iran is irreversible. Even if the U.S. lifted the sanctions today, it would not change Iran’s closer relationship with China, its hatred towards the U.S., and its determination to develop nuclear weapons. An unconditional lifting of the sanctions would be interpreted by some as a concrete proof that Biden is incapable of achieving the best U.S. national interests diplomatically.
Of course, the above debate will not stop, regardless of Biden’s future decisions. After all, U.S.–Iran distrust and hostility has lasted for nearly half a century and it is unlikely to end anytime soon. Furthermore, it is generally believed that the elderly Biden is only an “interim” president, one who will last, at most, one term. It is therefore questionable as to how long his Middle East policy will last.
T-Fai Yeung is a researcher at the Global Studies Institute Hong Kong, a blogger for Stand News, and a guest contributor to the Hong Kong Economic Journal and Linhe Zaobao (Singapore). The Chinese version of this article was published in Apple Daily (A16) on 11 February 2021.
美重返伊朗核協議利弊參半
特朗普擔任美國總統四年，其中一個標誌性的中東政策是單方面退出「聯合全面行動方案」（亦稱「伊朗核協議」），重啟對伊朗的制裁。支持者認為，伊朗經常侵犯人權，制裁符合民主大國的道義責任。再者，縱然伊朗得到國際原子能機構認證有遵守核協議，但核協議本身充滿漏洞。如放任不管下去，世上將會出現多一個擁有核武的邪惡國家。批評者則認為，特朗普單方面退出核協議不僅是出爾反爾，更是不尊重歐盟這個盟友的表現。他們期望拜登上場後能令美國重新認可原有的核協議。儘管拜登有意重新遵守原有的伊朗核協議，但各種困難擺在面前，要付諸實踐，談何容易。
窒礙美國重新遵守伊朗核協議的兩大阻力，分別是美國朝野對原有伊朗核協議的不滿聲音和伊朗的敵意態度。前者而言，由於伊朗核協議只是局部限制伊朗發展核能技術，沒有限制它繼續發展彈道導彈和支援鄰近地區的恐怖活動，所以一旦放寬對伊朗的制裁，對方反倒可獲得更多資源去擴張其在中東的影響力，令美國在中東的盟友面對更大的動盪不安。此外，原有的核協議不容許國際原子能機構隨時隨地突擊檢查伊朗的核設施，而且容許伊朗保留拒絕對方正式提出檢查任何設施的請求權利。更何況，伊朗核協議設有日落條款，伊朗大可在核協議原定生效期間韜光養晦，待協議期限屆滿後再把暗地裏發展的核武曝光。這正是為何特朗普當初不遵守承諾退出伊朗核協議也沒遭到一面倒非議的主因。目前而言，伊朗已不斷增加濃縮鈾生產。部份支持美國與伊朗重啟對話的聲音也認為，拜登不應單單以遵守原有的核協議作為最終的目標，而要設法讓伊朗受到更多的制約。
可是，儘管原有的伊朗核協議有不少瑕疵，但當初要達成相關協議已殊不容易。如今美伊關係較當年磋商核協議期間更為惡劣，雙方對話磋商的空間只會更窄。具體而言，特朗普退出伊朗核協議、刺殺伊朗伊斯蘭革命衞隊靈魂人物蘇萊馬尼，以及伊朗首席核專家法赫里扎德被以色列謀害等事件，均加深了伊朗政權對美國的仇恨。伊朗獨裁政權的鷹派勢力每次也利用事件煽動國內的民族主義情緒，溫和派的總統魯哈尼在政治權力核心的鬥爭中已黯然失勢。雖然伊朗礙於與美國和以色列的軍事實力差距而沒有撕破最後一張臉皮，但它不斷增加濃縮鈾生產為發展核武鳴鑼開道，已是路人皆知。伊朗即便受到武漢肺炎重創，也沒放緩發展核武的步伐。
拜登中東政策持久性成疑
本來外界有些聲音，甚或拜登本人也期望勝選後可迎來與伊朗修補關係的契機。然而，以色列先下手為強殺害法赫里扎德，一則旨在重挫伊朗的核武發展計劃，二則試圖阻止美國在伊朗政策上走回奧巴馬年代的舊路。事實上，法赫里扎德被殺一事使拜登未正式登上總統寶座已被進一步縛手縛腳，日後亦不能排除以方在伊朗問題上再主動出擊使美方陷於被動。
其實，伊朗自身也面對越趨嚴峻的經濟危機，理應有龐大的經濟誘因向美國請求撤銷制裁。正因如此，美國鷹派認為堅持極限施壓的伊朗政策便可看到對方跪下妥協的曙光。問題是，沒人能知道伊朗經濟危機與獨裁政權分崩離析的鴻溝到底有多大。伊朗已一再表明不會參與任何新核協議的談判，拜登最少在短期內也難以期望對方會在原有的伊朗核協議之上再作任何妥協。不過，也有評論指出，重啟制裁伊朗所造成的壞處已難以逆轉。即便美國現時立即解除對伊朗的制裁，也難以改變伊朗一面倒傾向中國、對美國的仇恨態度和發展核武的決心。在這個時候撤銷對伊朗的制裁，無疑是放虎歸山，後患無窮。這個舉動也會被解讀成拜登在外交上無力為美國爭取到更大國家利益的縮影。
無論如何，不論拜登往後的決定如何，上述的爭論不會戛然而止。畢竟，美伊角力已近半個世紀，而年紀老邁的拜登只被視為任期最多一屆的「臨時」總統。他的中東政策能維持多持久的影響力，也是一大疑問。
全文原載於《蘋果日報》2021年2月11日（A16)。
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自由評：伊朗投票率新低下 選出強硬派新總統萊希（香港電台《十萬八千里》，2021–06–26）
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兩岸專題：王毅訪伊朗 撒幣三萬億 華拉攏中東挑戰民主世界（《蘋果日報》，2021–04–01，A15）
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世紀疫情下的美伊關係（香港電台《左右紅藍錄》，2020–04–30）
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